

**WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

DARIO TOVAR, *Applicant*

vs.

SKILLSET GROUP LLC, *Defendant*

**Adjudication Number: ADJ21618015
Anaheim District Office**

**OPINION AND ORDERS
DENYING PETITION
FOR DISQUALIFICATION
DENYING PETITION
FOR REMOVAL AND
DISMISSING PETITION
FOR RECONSIDERATION**

Applicant has filed a petition for removal and a petition for reconsideration from the April 28, 2026 Minutes of Hearing, which ordered applicant's matter continued to a mandatory settlement conference. Applicant argues that a certified interpreter was not present at the hearing, that his right to due process was violated, and that his matter should not have been continued amongst other arguments.

Applicant also seeks disqualification of the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) based upon the allegation that the WCJ is not impartial and denied applicant's right to due process.

We have not received an answer from defendant. The WCJ filed a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Disqualification (Disqualification Report) recommending that we deny disqualification. The WCJ filed a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Removal (Removal Report) recommending that we deny removal.

We have considered the allegations of the Petitions for Disqualification, Removal, and Reconsideration and the contents of the WCJ's Reports. Based on our review of the record and based upon the WCJ's analysis of the merits contained in the WCJ's Reports, we will deny

disqualification and removal. We will dismiss the Petition for Reconsideration because it was not timely filed and because no final order has issued.¹

DISQUALIFICATION

Labor Code² section 5311 provides that a party may seek to disqualify a WCJ upon any one or more of the grounds specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 641. (§ 5311; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 641.) Among the grounds for disqualification under section 641 are that the WCJ has “formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action” (Code Civ. Proc., § 641(f)) or that the WCJ has demonstrated “[t]he existence of a state of mind ... evincing enmity against or bias toward either party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 641(g)).

Under WCAB Rule 10960, proceedings to disqualify a WCJ “shall be initiated by the filing of a petition for disqualification supported by an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury *stating in detail facts* establishing one or more of the grounds for disqualification” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10960, italics added.) It has long been recognized that “[t]he allegations in a statement charging bias and prejudice of a judge must set forth specifically the facts on which the charge is predicated,” that “[a] statement containing nothing but conclusions and setting forth no facts constituting a ground for disqualification may be ignored,” and that “[w]here no facts are set forth in the statement there is no issue of fact to be determined.” (*Mackie v. Dyer* (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 395, 399.)

Next, petitions for disqualification must be timely filed: “If the workers' compensation judge assigned to hear the matter and the grounds for disqualification are known, the petition for disqualification shall be filed not more than 10 days after service of notice of hearing or after grounds for disqualification are known.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10960.)

Furthermore, even if detailed and verified allegations of fact have been made, it is settled law that a WCJ is not subject to disqualification under section 641(f) if, prior to rendering a decision, the WCJ expresses an opinion regarding a legal or factual issue but the petitioner fails to show that this opinion is a fixed one that could not be changed upon the production of evidence and the presentation of arguments at or after further hearing. (*Taylor v. Industrial Acc. Com.*

¹ The Petition for Reconsideration appears to be in response to the WCJ's Report. In the future, such petitions should be properly labeled as a request to file a supplemental petition and must follow all appropriate rules for such filing. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10964.)

² All future references are to the Labor Code unless noted.

(*Thomas*) (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 75, 79–80 [5 Cal.Comp.Cases 61].) Additionally, even if the WCJ expresses an unqualified opinion on the merits, the WCJ is not subject to disqualification under section 641(f) if that opinion is “based upon the evidence then before [the WCJ] and upon the [WCJ’s] conception of the law as applied to such evidence.” (*Id.*; cf. *Kreling v. Superior Court* (1944) 25 Cal.2d 305, 312 [“It is [a judge’s] duty to consider and pass upon the evidence produced before him, and when the evidence is in conflict, to resolve that conflict in favor of the party whose evidence outweighs that of the opposing party.”].)

Also, it is “well settled ... that the expressions of opinion uttered by a judge, in what he conceives to be a discharge of his official duties, are not evidence of bias or prejudice” under section 641(g) (*Kreling, supra*, 25 Cal.2d at pp. 310–311; accord: *Mackie, supra*, 154 Cal.App.2d at p. 400) and that “[e]rroneous rulings against a litigant, even when numerous and continuous, form no ground for a charge of bias or prejudice, especially when they are subject to review.” (*McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.* (1916) 172 Cal. 6, 11; accord: *Mackie, supra*, 154 Cal.App.2d at p. 400 (emphasis added).) Similarly, “when the state of mind of the trial judge appears to be adverse to one of the parties but is based upon actual observance of the witnesses and the evidence given during the trial of an action, it does not amount to that prejudice against a litigant which disqualifies” the judge under section 641(g). (*Kreling, supra*, 25 Cal.2d at p. 312; see also *Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 [“When making a ruling, a judge interprets the evidence, weighs credibility, and makes findings. In doing so, the judge necessarily makes and expresses determinations in favor of and against parties. How could it be otherwise? We will not hold that every statement a judge makes to explain his or her reasons for ruling against a party constitutes evidence of judicial bias.”].)

Under no circumstances may a party’s unilateral and subjective perception of bias afford a basis for disqualification. (*Haas v. County of San Bernardino* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017, 1034; *Robbins v. Sharp Healthcare* (2006) 71 Cal.Comp.Cases 1291, 1310–1311 (Significant Panel Decision).)

Here, and based upon the analysis contained in the WCJ’s Report we deny the Petition for Disqualification.

REMOVAL

Removal is an extraordinary remedy rarely exercised by the Appeals Board. (*Cortez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 596, 599, fn. 5 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases 155];

Kleemann v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 274, 280, fn. 2 [70 Cal.Comp.Cases 133].) The Appeals Board will grant removal only if the petitioner shows that substantial prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is not granted. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 10955(a); see also *Cortez, supra*; *Kleemann, supra*.) Also, the petitioner must demonstrate that reconsideration will not be an adequate remedy if a final decision adverse to the petitioner ultimately issues. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10955(a).) Here, based upon the WCJ's analysis of the merits of petitioner's arguments, we are not persuaded that substantial prejudice or irreparable harm will result if removal is denied and/or that reconsideration will not be an adequate remedy if the matter ultimately proceeds to a final decision adverse to petitioner.

The WCJ ordered that this matter proceed to a mandatory settlement conference, which is required prior to setting any of the issues in applicant's case for trial. No trial on the merits has occurred in this proceeding.

Decisions of the Appeals Board "must be based on admitted evidence in the record." (*Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation (Hamilton)* (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, 476 (Appeals Board en banc).) Furthermore, decisions of the Appeals Board must be supported by substantial evidence. (Lab. Code, §§ 5903, 5952(d); *Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310]; *Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500]; *LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) An adequate and complete record is necessary to understand the basis for the WCJ's decision. (Lab. Code, § 5313; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10761.)

Here, once the parties proceed to trial, they will have an opportunity to create a record, raise all relevant issues, and submit evidence. The trial WCJ can then consider the evidence and the legal arguments raised by the parties and determine how best to proceed.

Applicant objects that a certified interpreter was not present at the April 2026 hearing. It appears that a certified interpreter's absence may have been an inadvertent error as applicant dismissed his attorney shortly before the April 2026 hearing and applicant may not have been aware of his right to notify the court and defendant of his need for an interpreter at the hearing. Now that the court and defendant are on notice, it appears that this issue is moot.

RECONSIDERATION

I.

On July 20, 2026, applicant filed a Petition for Reconsideration, in essence, raising similar objections to those contained in the Petition for Removal.

Petitions for reconsideration filed on or after July 14, 2026 are subject to Labor Code section 5909, which states that:

- (a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board.
- (b)
 - (1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
 - (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.

Under Labor Code section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase “The case is sent to the Recon board.”

Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on July 23, 2026, and 60 days from the date of transmission is Monday, September 21, 2026. This decision is issued by or on September 21, 2026, so that we have timely acted on the Petition as required by Labor Code section 5909(a).

Labor Code section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to act on a petition. Labor Code section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report shall be notice of transmission.

Here, according to our review of the record, we did not receive a Report by a WCJ, and no other notice to the parties of the transmission of the case to the Appeals Board was provided by

the district office. Thus, we conclude that the parties were not provided with the notice of transmission required by Labor Code section 5909(b)(1). While this failure to provide notice does not alter the time for the Appeals Board to act on the petition, we note that as a result the parties did not have notice of the commencement of the 60-day period on July 23, 2026.

II.

As stated in our en banc decision:

A petition for reconsideration may properly be taken only from a “final” order, decision, or award. (Lab. Code, §§ 5900(a), 5902, 5903.) A “final” order has been defined as one that either “determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case” (*Rymer v. Hagler* (1989) 211 Cal. App. 3d 1171, 1180, 260 Cal. Rptr. 76; *Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer)* (1980) 104 Cal. App. 3d 528, 534–535 [163 Cal. Rptr. 750, 45 Cal. Comp. Cases 410]; *Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer)* (1978) 82 Cal. App. 3d 39, 45 [43 Cal. Comp. Cases 661]) or determines a “threshold” issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits. (*Maranian v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2000) 81 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1070, 1075 [97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 65 Cal. Comp. Cases 650].) Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers' compensation proceedings, are not considered “final” orders. (*Id.* at p. 1075 [“interim orders, which do not decide a threshold issue, such as intermediate procedural or evidentiary decisions, are not ‘final’ ”]; *Rymer, supra*, at p. 1180 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders or discovery orders”]; *Kramer, supra*, at p. 45 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders”].) Such interlocutory decisions include, but are not limited to, pre-trial orders regarding evidence, discovery, trial setting, venue, or similar issues.

(*Ledezma v. Kareem Cart Commissary and Mfg.* (2024) 89 Cal. Comp. Cases 462, 475 (En Banc).)

There are 25 days allowed within which to file a petition for reconsideration from a “final” decision that has been served by mail upon an address in California. (§§ 5900(a), 5903; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10507(a)(1).) This time limit is extended to the next business day if the last day for filing falls on a weekend or holiday. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10508.) To be timely, however, a petition for reconsideration must be *filed* with (i.e., received by) the WCAB within the time allowed; proof that the petition was mailed within that period is insufficient. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10845(a), 10392(a).)

This time limit is jurisdictional and, therefore, the Appeals Board has no authority to consider or act upon an untimely petition for reconsideration. (*Maranian v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1076 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 650, 656]; *Rymer v. Hagler*

(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1182; *Scott v Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 979, 984 [46 Cal.Comp.Cases 1008, 1011]; *U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Hinojoza)* (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 545, 549 [27 Cal.Comp.Cases 73, 75-76].)

Here, the order issued by the WCJ was a continuance, which is not a final order. Furthermore, applicant's Petition for Reconsideration was filed well beyond 25 days from the issuance of the April 2026 minutes. Thus, to the extent that applicant seeks reconsideration, the Petition for Reconsideration is dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that applicant's Petition for Disqualification of the WCJ filed on May 7, 2026, is **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that applicant's Petition for Removal of the order of continuance issued on April 28, 2026, by the WCJ is **DENIED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that applicant's Petition for Reconsideration of the order of continuance issued on April 28, 2026, by the WCJ is **DISMISSED**.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR

I CONCUR,

/s/ JOSEPH V. CAPURRO, COMMISSIONER

/s/ KATHERINE WILLIAMS DODD, COMMISSIONER



DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

September 8, 2026

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

**DARIO TOVAR
BRADFORD & BARTHEL**

EDL/mt

I certify that I affixed the official seal of the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to this
original decision on this date. *abs*