

**WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

RAUL MAGANA, *Applicant*

vs.

**COUNTY OF TULARE;
permissibly self-insured, administered by CORVEL, *Defendants***

**Adjudication Number: ADJ14609243 ADJ17389142
Fresno District Office**

**OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION**

Defendant seeks reconsideration of the July 8, 2025 Findings and Order issued by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). Therein, the WCJ found that the evidence does not support any determination of apportionment, as the opinion expressed by Dr. Gwartz (Joint Exhibit 4) is self-contradictory and does not provide the necessary opinion, nor explanation, to allow it to be considered substantial medical evidence.¹ Based on this finding, the WCJ ordered that applicant be awarded 30% whole person impairment, equal to \$78,662.50 in permanent disability indemnity.

Defendant contends that the WCJ erred in failing to find apportionment arguing that the opinion of Dr. Gwartz is substantial medical evidence.

We received an Answer. The WCJ issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that we deny reconsideration.

We have considered the Petition for Reconsideration and the contents of the Report, and we have reviewed the record in this matter. Based upon our preliminary review of the record, we will grant defendant's Petition for Reconsideration. Our order granting the Petition for Reconsideration is not a final order, and we will order that a final decision after reconsideration is

¹ The parties stipulated that applicant sustained industrial injury to his psyche and in the form of ulcerative colitis, while employed as a cook III, during the period of January 28, 2019 to January 28, 2020.

deferred pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law. Once a final decision after reconsideration is issued by the Appeals Board, any aggrieved person may timely seek a writ of review pursuant to Labor Code section 5950 et seq.

I.

Preliminarily, we note that former Labor Code² section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (Lab. Code, § 5909.) Effective July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:

- (a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board.
- (b)
 - (1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
 - (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.

Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase “The case is sent to the Recon board.”

Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on August 12, 2025 and 60 days from the date of transmission is Saturday, October 11, 2025. The next business day that is 60 days from the date of transmission is Monday, October 13, 2025. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b).)³ This decision is issued by or on Monday, October 13, 2025, so that we have timely acted on the petition as required by section 5909(a).

² All further statutory references are to the Labor Code, unless otherwise noted.

³ WCAB Rule 10600(b) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b)) states that:

Unless otherwise provided by law, if the last day for exercising or performing any right or duty to act or respond falls on a weekend, or on a holiday for which the offices of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board are closed, the act or response may be performed or exercised upon the next business day.

Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to act on a petition. Labor Code section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall be notice of transmission.

Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers' compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on August 12, 2025, and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on August 12, 2025. Service of the Report and transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period on August 12, 2025.

II.

The WCJ provided the following summary of facts in the Report:

The only disputed issues deal with the impairment caused by the ulcerative colitis, and the apportionment of industrial versus non-industrial disability. Both issues were arguably addressed by QME Dr. Gwartz in his report admitted into evidence. It was the conclusion of Dr. Gwartz that the impairment should be apportioned 30% to industrial factors and 70% to non-industrial factors.

The trial judge found the opinion of Dr. Gwartz did not support any finding of apportionment "as the opinion expressed... is self-contradictory and does not provide the necessary opinion, nor explanation, to allow it to be considered substantial medical evidence." (Findings and Order, op. on Decision, 7/5/2025, 8:30 a.m. session, at p. 2.) The judge further explained why the opinion of Dr. Gwartz failed as substantial evidence.

However, petitioner then argues that if the trier of fact opined there was insufficient evidence to make that determination, then the only recourse would be to reopen discovery and further develop the record. In essence, to provide a lifeline to the petitioner for a second chance. The court believes this opinion is misplaced.

(Report, at p. 2.)

III.

We highlight the following legal principles that may be relevant to our review of this matter:

It is well established that decisions by the Appeals Board must be supported by substantial evidence. (Lab. Code, §§ 5903, 5952(d); *Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal. Comp. Cases 310]; *Garza, supra*; *LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal. Comp. Cases 16].) “The term ‘substantial evidence’ means evidence which, if true, has probative force on the issues. It is more than a mere scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion ... It must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” (*Braewood Convalescent Hosp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Bolton)* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 159, 164 [48 Cal.Comp.Cases 566], emphasis removed and citations omitted.) To constitute substantial evidence “... a medical opinion must be framed in terms of reasonable medical probability, it must not be speculative, it must be based on pertinent facts and on an adequate examination and history, and it must set forth reasoning in support of its conclusions.” (*Escobedo v. Marshalls* (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604, 621 (Appeals Board en banc).)

The defendant has the burden of proof on apportionment. (Lab. Code, § 5705; *Pullman Kellogg v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd. (Normand)* (1980) 26 Cal.3d 450, 456 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 170]; *Kopping v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kopping)* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1115 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases 1229]; *Escobedo v. Marshalls (Escobedo)* (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604, 613 (Appeals Board en banc).) To meet this burden, the defendant “must demonstrate that, based upon reasonable medical probability, there is a legal basis for apportionment.” (*Gay v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Gay)* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 555, 564 [44 Cal.Comp.Cases 817]; see also *Escobedo, supra*, at p. 620.) Here, it is unclear from our preliminary review that there is substantial medical evidence to support the WCJ's decision without additional development of the record.

IV.

In addition, under our broad grant of authority, our jurisdiction over this matter is continuing.

A grant of reconsideration has the effect of causing “the whole subject matter [to be] reopened for further consideration and determination” (*Great Western Power Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Savercool)* (1923) 191 Cal.724, 729 [10 I.A.C. 322]) and of “[throwing] the entire

record open for review.” (*State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com. (George)* (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 201, 203 [19 Cal.Comp.Cases 98].) Thus, once reconsideration has been granted, the Appeals Board has the full power to make new and different findings on issues presented for determination at the trial level, even with respect to issues not raised in the petition for reconsideration before it. (See Lab. Code, §§ 5907, 5908, 5908.5; see also *Gonzales v. Industrial Acci. Com.* (1958) 50 Cal.2d 360, 364.) “[t]here is no provision in chapter 7, dealing with proceedings for reconsideration and judicial review, limiting the time within which the commission may make its decision on reconsideration, and in the absence of a statutory authority limitation none will be implied.”; see generally Lab. Code, § 5803 [“The WCAB has continuing jurisdiction over its orders, decisions, and awards. . . . At any time, upon notice and after an opportunity to be heard is given to the parties in interest, the appeals board may rescind, alter, or amend any order, decision, or award, good cause appearing therefor.”].)

“The WCAB . . . is a constitutional court; hence, its final decisions are given res judicata effect.” (*Azadigian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 372, 374 [57 Cal.Comp.Cases 391; see *Dow Chemical Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 483, 491 [32 Cal.Comp.Cases 431]; *Dakins v. Board of Pension Commissioners* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 374, 381 [184 Cal.Rptr. 576]; *Solari v. Atlas-Universal Service, Inc.* (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 587, 593 [30 Cal.Rptr. 407].) A “final” order has been defined as one that either “determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case” (*Rymer v. Hagler* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; *Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer)* (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410]; *Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer)* (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases 661]), or determines a “threshold” issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits. Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers’ compensation proceedings, are not considered “final” orders. (*Maranian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1070, 1075 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 650].) [“interim orders, which do not decide a threshold issue, such as intermediate procedural or evidentiary decisions, are not ‘final’ ”]; *Rymer, supra*, at p. 1180 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders or discovery orders”]; *Kramer, supra*, at p. 45 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders”].)

Section 5901 states in relevant part that:

No cause of action arising out of any final order, decision or award made and filed by the appeals board or a workers' compensation judge shall accrue in any court to any person until and unless the appeals board on its own motion sets aside the final order, decision, or award and removes the proceeding to itself or if the person files a petition for reconsideration, and the reconsideration is granted or denied. ...

Thus, this is not a final decision on the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration, and we will order that issuance of the final decision after reconsideration is deferred. Once a final decision is issued by the Appeals Board, any aggrieved person may timely seek a writ of review pursuant to Labor Code sections 5950 et seq.

V.

Accordingly, we grant defendant's Petition for Reconsideration, and order that a final decision after reconsideration is deferred pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Petition for Reconsideration is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a final decision after reconsideration is **DEFERRED** pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ KATHERINE WILLIAMS DODD, COMMISSIONER

I CONCUR,

/s/ JOSÉ H. RAZO, COMMISSIONER

/s/ JOSEPH V. CAPURRO, COMMISSIONER



DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

OCTOBER 13, 2025

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

**RAUL MAGANA
MITCHELL & POWELL
DUNCAN CASSIO LUCCHESI BINKLEY & VAN DOREN**

PAG/bp

I certify that I affixed the official seal of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to this original decision on this date.
BP