WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

OLATUNJI RAHEEM, *Applicant*

vs.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, permissibly self-insured, *Defendants*

Adjudication Number: ADJ18543951
San Francisco District Office

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION

Applicant seeks reconsideration of the May 20, 2025 Findings of Fact and Orders (F&O), wherein the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found that applicant did not sustain his burden of establishing injury arising out of and in the course of employment (AOE/COE). The WCJ reasoned that applicant's trial testimony was incompatible with the medical evidence and was thus not credible.

Applicant contends that substantial medical evidence in the record supports a finding of injury AOE/COE.

We have not received an answer from any party. The WCJ prepared a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report), recommending that the Petition be denied.

Applicant has also filed a "Submission of Additional Documentary Evidence for Consideration on Petition for Reconsideration," dated July 14, 2025. Therein, applicant requests that we review four additional trial exhibits not otherwise admitted into evidence at trial. We have received an objection thereto filed by defendant City and County of San Francisco (defendant). We observe that Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) Rule 10964 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10964(b)) requires the party offering a supplemental pleading to file a separate petition

setting forth good cause for supplemental pleading. WCAB Rule 10974 provides the method by which a party may seek reconsideration based on allegations of newly discovered evidence and/or fraud. Here, however, applicant's supplemental pleading does not address good cause for the admission of additional evidence or the review of supplemental pleadings, and does not assert the existence of newly discovered evidence. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10974.) Accordingly, we decline to accept the supplemental pleadings and have reviewed neither the supplemental pleadings nor the attached evidence herein. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10964(c); Lab. Code, § 5502(d)(3).)

We have considered the allegations of the Petition for Reconsideration and the contents of the report of the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) with respect thereto. Based on our review of the record, and for the reasons discussed below, we will grant reconsideration, rescind the F&O, and substitute new findings of fact that applicant sustained injury AOE/COE to his left knee, with a corresponding entitlement to medical treatment necessary to cure or relieve from the effects of the industrial injury.

FACTS

Applicant claimed injury to his left knee while employed as a union laborer track maintenance worker by defendant on September 30, 2023. Defendant denies injury AOE/COE.

The parties have selected Albert Retodo, M.D., as the Qualified Medical Evaluator (QME) in orthopedic medicine. On March 7, 2024, Dr. Retodo evaluated applicant and issued a report dated April 15, 2024 in which he noted that applicant had a symptomatic history of gout. Nonetheless, the QME determined that applicant sustained a "[s]pecific industrial injury to the left knee, dated [September 30, 2023], strain/sprain injury, with [April 12, 2024] MRI evidence of lateral patellar tilt and subluxation with patellofemoral degenerative change and chondral thinning and moderately large joint effusion and small popliteal cyst with distal patellar tendinosis." (Ex. 1, Report of Albert Retodo, M.D., dated April 15, 2024.)

On October 13, 2024, Dr. Retodo issued a supplemental report and record review. Therein, the QME noted that applicant's medical record was positive for a history of a specific industrial injury to the left knee in 2014, and the development of right knee pain in 2015. (Ex. 2, Report of Albert Retodo, M.D., dated October 13, 2024, at p. 17.) Following his review of the records, however, the QME found no cause to change his prior opinions. (*Ibid*.)

On January 2, 2025, Dr. Retodo issued a supplemental report following a review of records relevant to applicant's prior knee injuries and diagnosis of gout. (Ex. 3, Report of Albert Retodo, M.D., dated January 2, 2025, at p. 2.) The QME concluded that while the records regarding prior injury "may be significant when Mr. Raheem does reach a point of maximal medical improvement … all opinions in my [April 15, 2024] report stand as is." (*Id.* at p. 20.)

On February 20, 2025, the parties proceeded to trial on the issues of injury AOE/COE to the left knee and the need for further medical treatment. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence (Minutes), dated February 20, 2025, at p. 2:23.)

Applicant testified, in relevant part, that he was engaged in his normal duties on September 30, 2023, walking alongside trolley tracks "checking pulleys and beams that pull the trolleys" when he heard a "snap like something popped out of place" in his left knee. (*Id.* at p. 5:10.) Four days later, applicant sought medical treatment from Methodist Hospital, and later the same day, at Kaiser Permanente. Applicant testified that he was not aware that the diagnosis entered in the contemporaneous reporting attributed causation to applicant's preexisting gout condition. (*Id.* at p. 6:25.) Applicant testified to his recollection that the physicians at Kaiser "told the applicant he did not believe that gout was the cause of the injury because gout doesn't last that long." (*Id.* at p. 6:41.)

On May 20, 2025, the WCJ issued the F&O, determining in relevant part that applicant claimed injury on September 30, 2023 to his left knee (Finding of Fact No. 1), but that "applicant has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence the occurrence of a compensable injury arising from the employment identified in Finding of Fact No. 1." (Finding of Fact No. 4.)

The WCJ's Opinion on Decision explained that while he found QME Dr. Retodo's attribution of a non-gout injury to the left knee to be persuasive, that the record did not support that applicant's alleged injury of September 30, 2023 was the non-gout injury identified by the QME. (Opinion on Decision, at p. 14.) The WCJ was not persuaded that applicant "told providers at Methodist Hospital of a mechanism of injury consistent with that of his testimony at trial," and that the subsequent records from Kaiser Permanente documented applicant's reporting of an "atraumatic" injury. (*Id.* at p. 15.) The WCJ noted that applicant's medical records from October, 2023 denied the development of pain in the left knee following the alleged injury, which was incompatible with applicant's trial testimony of the immediate onset of pain causing him to discontinue work. (*Ibid*.) Following a review of the evidentiary record, the WCJ concluded that

applicant's trial testimony was not credible, and on that basis, that applicant had not met his affirmative burden of establishing injury AOE/COE. (*Id.* at p. 17.)

Applicant's Petition asserts that pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in *Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500], the WCJ's credibility determination cannot override uncontradicted medical evidence. (Petition, at p. 6:17.) Applicant further contends that the MRI studies taken in April, 2024 offer objective support for the QME's opinions in support of industrial causation, and that the totality of the evidentiary record meets and exceeds applicant's burden of establishing industrial injury to a preponderance of the evidence. (*Id.* at p. 9:1.)

The WCJ's Report notes that QME Dr. Retodo's opinion are premised in part on applicant's recounting of the history of injury, and to the extent that the underlying assertions made by applicant are incompatible with the medical record and therefore not credible, the QME's conclusions resting thereupon are likewise not substantial evidence. (Report, at pp. 15-16.)

DISCUSSION

I.

Former Labor Code[1] section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (Lab. Code, § 5909.) Effective July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:

> (a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board.
>
> (b)
>
> (1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
>
> (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.

Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under

[1] All further references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise noted.

Event Description is the phrase "Sent to Recon" and under Additional Information is the phrase "The case is sent to the Recon board."

Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on July 1, 2025, and 60 days from the date of transmission is Saturday, August 30, 2025. The next business day that is 60 days from the date of transmission is Tuesday, September 2, 2025. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b).)[2] This decision is issued by or on September 2, 2025, so that we have timely acted on the petition as required by section 5909(a).

Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall be notice of transmission.

Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers' compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on July 1, 2025, and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on July 1, 2025. Service of the Report and transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period on July 1, 2025.

II.

It is well established that the decisions of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board must be supported by substantial evidence. (Lab. Code § 5903; *LeVesque v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, 635-637 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) When the WCJ's findings are supported by solid, credible evidence, they are to be accorded great weight by the Appeals Board and rejected only on the basis of substantial evidence in light of the entire record. (*Lamb v. Workman's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310].)

[2] WCAB Rule 10600(b) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b)) states that:

> Unless otherwise provided by law, if the last day for exercising or performing any right or duty to act or respond falls on a weekend, or on a holiday for which the offices of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board are closed, the act or response may be performed or exercised upon the next business day.

However, on reconsideration "the board is empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence [citations], to make its own credibility determinations [citations], and … to reject the findings of the [WCJ] and enter its own findings on the basis of its review of the record." (*Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 317 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500]; accord *Lamb, supra,* 11 Cal.3d at pp. 280–28.) On reconsideration, the Appeals Board has "considerable discretion" and "enjoys broad authority" (*Redner v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 83, 92 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 371]) and it can "redetermine the case upon the existing record" and take a "different view of the same evidence" than the WCJ. (*Argonaut Ins. Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Bellinger)* (1958) 49 Cal.2d 706, 709–712 [23 Cal.Comp.Cases 34].) "[N]evertheless, any award, order or decision of the Board must be supported by substantial evidence in the light of the entire record." (*Bracken v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 246, 255 [54 Cal.Comp.Cases 349].)

Hence, the Appeals Board must look to the underlying facts of a medical opinion to determine whether or not that opinion constitutes substantial evidence (*Redner v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 83, 96-97 [36 Cal.Comp.Cases 371]), bearing in mind that the Appeals Board is not at liberty to completely ignore those parts of a doctor's report and testimony which do not support its conclusion. (*Greenberg v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 792, 799 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 242].) In order to constitute substantial evidence, a physician's report must be framed in terms of reasonable medical probability, it must not be speculative, it must be based on pertinent facts and on an adequate examination and history, and it must set forth reasoning in support of its conclusions. (*Escobedo v. Marshalls* (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604 (Appeals Board en banc) (*Escobedo*).)

Here, applicant alleges that he sustained industrial injury on September 30, 2023, and that he sought medical treatment at the Emergency Department of Methodist Hospital four days later. (Opinion on Decision, at pp. 6-7.) Later that same day, applicant sought medical treatment at Kaiser Permanente. The WCJ's decision observes that in both instances, there was no indication of a workplace injury transpiring four days previously, no reporting of a mechanism of injury involving a "pop" or "crack" from applicant's knee, and in both instances, the evaluating physicians noted a significant and ongoing medical history of gout. (*Id.* at p. 7.) Subsequent evaluations by Kaiser's Occupational Health practice noted "no obvious mechanism of injury,"

but rather a "history of gout and … symptoms consistent with prior flares." (Ex. E, Kaiser Permanent Records, dated October 24, 2023, at p. 4.)

The WCJ further notes that the first medical documentation in the record that coincides with applicant's testimony of a popping sensation at work on September 30, 2023 involving the left knee was applicant's evaluation with QME Dr. Retodo, some six months after the alleged incident. (Opinion on Decision, at p. 16.) The WCJ observes that the medical records do not support applicant's trial testimony of immediate onset of pain following industrial injury, and that it is unlikely that multiple medical providers across multiple service dates would all fail to document an alleged mechanism of injury. (*Ibid*.) Thus, the WCJ concludes that "I would not find a single discrepancy fatal to the applicant's case, but the number of discrepancies, and that they exist in the reporting of multiple providers, undermines the credibility of the applicant's testimony." Because applicant's testimony was deemed not credible, and because Dr. Retodo's causation analysis is premised in part on applicant's recounting of the mechanism, the WCJ concludes that applicant has not met his burden of establishing, to a preponderance of the evidence, that he sustained injury AOE/COE. (*Id.* at p. 17.)

We acknowledge the careful and thoughtful analysis of the WCJ as reflected in the systematic review of the relevant evidence and the applicable case law authority. However, we also find the Supreme Court's analysis in *Garza, supra*, 3 Cal.3d 312, to be relevant.

In *Garza*, applicant sustained injury on January 5, 1969, but did not report the injury immediately, waiting 19 days to file a claim. Applicant's injury was superimposed on a prior 1954 back injury and applicant testified he completely recovered from this prior injury. The medical record, however, reflected ongoing low back complaints. The trial referee in *Garza* nonetheless found injury AOE/COE but was reversed by the WCAB, which noted that the record did not support industrial injury. The WCAB observed that applicant "had made no report of the injury to his coemployees or employer immediately following the alleged injury; that petitioner did not inform his doctors of the accident until January 13; and that petitioner failed to inform his employer's compensation coordinator thereof until January 24." In addition, the WCAB "emphasized petitioner's failure to notify his doctors of the incident, stating that '[i]t is not reasonable to assume that applicant would seek treatment and then not advise the doctors of the condition which allegedly played a part in compelling him to seek such treatment.'" (*Id.* at p. 316.)

Following applicant's appeal, the California Supreme Court began its analysis as follows:

> Although the employee bears the burden of proving that his injury was sustained in the course of his employment, the established legislative policy is that the Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed in the employee's favor (Lab. Code, § 3202), and all reasonable doubts as to whether an injury arose out of employment are to be resolved in favor of the employee. (*Lundberg v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.*, 69 Cal.2d 436, 439 [71 Cal.Rptr. 684, 445 P.2d 300].) This rule is binding upon the board and this court. (Id. at p. 439.)
>
> Moreover, although the board is empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence [citations omitted], to make its own credibility determinations [citations omitted], and upon reconsideration to reject the findings of the referee and enter its own findings on the basis of its review of the record [citations omitted], nevertheless, any award, order or decision of the board must be supported by substantial evidence in the light of the entire record (Lab. Code, § 5952; *LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.*, 1 Cal.3d 627, 635 [83 Cal.Rptr. 208, 463 P.2d 432]).
>
> In *LeVesque, supra*, this court rejected prior decisions which suggested that the board's decision would be sustained if supported by any evidence whatsoever, and we determined that the test of substantiality must be measured on the basis of the entire record, rather than by simply isolating evidence which supports the board and ignoring other relevant facts of record which rebut or explain that evidence. (1 Cal.3d at pp. 638-639, fn. 22.) Upon reviewing the entire record in this case, we have concluded that the evidence relied upon by the board to discredit petitioner's uncontradicted testimony was insubstantial and cannot support its decision.

(*Id.* at p. 317.)

The *Garza* court further noted the general dearth of evidence offered to rebut applicant's claim of injury:

> As a general rule, the board "must accept as true the intended meaning of [evidence] both uncontradicted and unimpeached." (*LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra*, 1 Cal.3d 627, 639; *McAllister v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra*, 69 Cal.2d 408, 413; see *Wilhelm v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra*, 255 Cal.App.2d 30, 33.) At the hearing, respondents made no effort to impeach petitioner's testimony by showing, through medical opinion, that he suffered no injury on January 5, or by proving that such an injury could not have occurred in the manner testified to by him. Indeed, with one possible exception, the evidence relied upon by the appeals board sustains petitioner's assertion that he suffered an industrial accident on that date. There is no question that petitioner did in fact have a back condition which ultimately required surgery to correct, and petitioner adequately explained his reasons for not reporting his

> injury to his employer or doctors. As stated in *Lundberg v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra*, 69 Cal.2d 436, 440, "It should be stressed that where the undisputed evidence points towards an industrial injury had the board any doubts as to the cause of the injury, it has the means to resolve those doubts. Upon the filing of a petition for reconsideration the board may direct the taking of additional evidence (Lab. Code, § 5906), and the board is given power to direct any employee claiming compensation to be examined by a physician (Lab. Code, § 5701). In the instant case, the board did not follow this procedure and attempt to resolve any doubts it may have had with respect to the inference of industrial causation. Instead it determined in the absence of any supporting evidence to reject the inference of industrial causation, and this it may not do."

(*Id.* at p. 318.)

Accordingly, the *Garza* court concluded that the Appeals Board failed to accord the appropriate weight to the referee's findings, that the evidence used to reject the WCJ's finding of industrial causation was conjectural and speculative, and that "the denial of compensation benefits cannot rest upon the board's mere suspicion or surmise, in view of the policy of the law to resolve all reasonable doubts in the employee's favor." (*Id.* at p. 319.)

Here, we find a similar analysis is warranted. We observe in the first instance that applicant's allegation of industrial injury finds support in the medical-legal analysis of QME Dr. Retodo. The QME has reviewed medical records relevant to applicant's 2014 left and 2015 right knee injuries, and has further reviewed diagnostic MRI studies of April 12, 2024, and has undertaken a competent clinical evaluation of applicant. Following a review of more than 2,500 pages of relevant medical and diagnostic records, the QME concludes that "in reviewing Mr. Olatunji Raheem's current complaints, history, physical exam findings, and submitted medical records and diagnostic study, it is my opinion, with a reasonable medical probability, that Mr. Olatunji Raheem did sustain a specific industrial injury to the left knee on [September 30, 2023], while working for San Francisco Municipal Railway. He therefore should be entitled to receive the appropriate diagnostics and treatment in regard to his industrial injury." (Ex. 1, Report of Albert Retodo, M.D., dated April 15, 2024, at p. 8.)

While acknowledging the potential for nonindustrial apportionment arising out of prior injuries, the QME's opinion regarding industrial causation has remained unchanged following a review of the submitted medical record as described in supplemental reports dated October 13, 2024 and January 2, 2025. (Ex. 2, Report of Albert Retodo, M.D., dated October 13, 2024, at p. 17; Ex. 3, Report of Albert Retodo, M.D., dated January 2, 2025, at p. 2.) The QME also noted

as significant the October 24, 2023 "office visit with Kaiser, documenting the [September 30, 2023] left knee date of injury, where pain is accompanied by decreased range of motion and knee effusion." (Ex. 2, Report of Albert Retodo, M.D., dated October 13, 2024, at p. 17.)

We also observe that although the October 4, 2023 records from Methodist Hospital do not reflect a specific mechanism of injury, they do reflect "left knee pain and swelling for the last 4 days," which corresponds to the claimed date of injury of September 30, 2023. (Ex. B, Records of Methodist Hospital of Sacramento, dated Octboer 4, 2023.) The Kaiser Permanente records from later that same day similarly document the onset of pain and discomfort approximately five days prior. (Ex. D, Records of Kaiser Permanente, dated October 4, 2023, at p. 12.) And in a follow-up evaluation with Kaiser's Occupational Medicine department on October 24, 2023, the timeline of symptoms appearing five days after the injury was reiterated. We also observe that although the October 24, 2023 evaluation identified no specific mechanism of injury, applicant suggested that "on September 30, he had been going up and on the heels as a part of his work activities. He did not notice any pain at the time. He thought it was gout, however after his symptoms have persisted for roughly a month, he believes that he may have tweaked his knee." (Ex. E, Records of Kaiser Permanente, dated October 24, 2023, at p. 4.)

We note the WCJ's observation that insofar as the Kaiser records indicate applicant denied noticing any pain at the time of the injury, such assertions are inconsistent with applicant's trial testimony regarding leaving work early on September 30, 2023 due to the pain. (Report, at p. 18.)

On the other hand, we also note that there is no affirmative evidence in the record rebutting applicant's claim as to the mechanism of injury. Applicant testified that he spent the day of the injury performing repetitive work involving "walking all the way from Beach and Hyde all the way down to Van Ness, Van Ness and Market, all the way down to the other end of Market," and that his job required him to "pull up drain storms by hooking them with a metal hook and bending at the knees when pulling up." (Report, at p. 10.) Yet, despite the shift of burden to defendant to challenge this testimony, defendant interposes no witnesses or documentary evidence in rebuttal with respect to applicant's recitation of the events on September 30, 2023, including from applicant's co-worker Felipe or from applicant's supervisor.

We thus acknowledge the WCJ's observations with respect to inconsistencies in the evidentiary record, and we further accord to the WCJ's credibility determinations the great weight to which they are entitled. (*Garza, supra*, 3 Cal.3d at p. 317.) However, "the test of substantiality

must be measured on the basis of the entire record, rather than by simply isolating evidence which supports the board and ignoring other relevant facts of record which rebut or explain that evidence." (*Id.* at p. 317; *LaVesque, supra*, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 638-639.) In addition, we observe that insofar as the medical reporting of Dr. Retodo constitutes substantial evidence, the WCAB may not substitute its judgment for that of a medical expert. (*E.L. Yeager Construction v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (*Gatten*) (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 922, 929 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases 1687].) Finally, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's exhortation that pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act and section 3202, "all reasonable doubts as to whether an injury arose out of employment are to be resolved in favor of the employee." (*Lundberg v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.* (1968) 69 Cal.2d 436, 439 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 656].)

Based on the foregoing analysis and following our complete and independent review of the entire evidentiary record, we are persuaded that the QME's medical-legal determination as supported in the medical record and applicant's unchallenged trial testimony supports a finding of industrial injury, to a preponderance of the evidence. (*Lamb v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274, 280-281 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310].)

Accordingly, we will grant applicant's Petition, rescind the F&O, and substitute new Findings of Fact that applicant sustained industrial injury to his left knee arising out of and in the course of employment, and that applicant is entitled to medical treatment to cure or relieve from the effects of the industrial injury.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that reconsideration of the decision of May 20, 2025 is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as the Decision After Reconsideration of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board that the decision of May 20, 2025 is **RESCINDED** with the following **SUBSTITUTED** therefor:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Applicant Olatunjo Raheem, while employed on September 30, 2023, as a union laborer track maintenance worker, occupational group number 480, at San Francisco, California, by the City and County of San Francisco, sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment to his left knee.

2. Applicant is entitled to future medical treatment to cure or relieve from the effects of his industrial injury.

ORDER

a. Defendant's Exhibit H is admitted into evidence.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ JOSEPH V. CAPURRO, COMMISSIONER

I CONCUR,

/s/ KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR

/s/ PAUL F. KELLY, COMMISSIONER

DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

August 29, 2025

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

OLATUNJI RAHEEM
ARNS DAVIS LAW
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY (SAN FRANCISCO)

SAR/abs

I certify that I affixed the official seal of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board to this original decision on this date. *abs*