WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL LOPEZ, Applicant

VS.

MICROFORM PRECISION, LLC; COMPWEST INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants

Adjudication Number: ADJ15945803 Sacramento District Office

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Applicant seeks reconsideration of a March 26, 2024 Order Approving Compromise and Release (OACR) issued by a workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The Compromise and Release (C&R) resolved applicant's claimed December 22, 2021 injury to her arm, wrist, fingers, and shoulders and was based upon the opinion of panel Qualified Medical Evaluator (QME), Dr. Stephanie Janiak. Applicant now seeks to set aside the OACR so that a new QME report that finds further impairment may be considered.

We have not received an Answer from defendant. The WCJ prepared a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report), recommending that the Petition be denied.

We have considered the Petition, the Report, and have reviewed the record in this matter. For the reasons discussed below, we will dismiss applicant's Petition as premature and return this matter to the trial level so that the WCJ may consider the Petition as one to set aside the OACR.

FACTS

Applicant, while employed by defendant as a welder on December 22, 2021, sustained an industrial injury to the arm, wrist, fingers, and shoulders. The parties retained panel QME, Dr. Stephanie Janiak, who issued a report dated January 2, 2024, wherein she found a 22% permanent disability. A supplemental report was requested by applicant, but the parties ultimately settled the

claim via a Compromise and Release agreement in the amount of \$60,000 on March 19, 2024. An Order Approving Compromise and Release was issued by the WCJ on March 26, 2024. Thereafter, on March 29, 2024, the requested supplemental report was issued wherein the QME found increased impairment.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Labor Code section 5803, "The appeals board has continuing jurisdiction over all its orders, decisions, and awards made and entered under the provisions of [Division 4] . . . At any time, upon notice and after the opportunity to be heard is given to the parties in interest, the appeals board may rescind, alter, or amend any order, decision, or award, good cause appearing therefor."

Further, the "Workers' Compensation Appeals Board shall inquire into the adequacy of all Compromise and Release agreements and Stipulations with Request for Award and may set the matter for hearing to take evidence when necessary to determine whether the agreement should be approved or disapproved, or issue findings and awards." (Cal. Code Regs., tit 8, § 10700(b).) The legal principles governing Compromise and Release agreements are the same as those governing other contracts. (*Burbank Studios v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 929, 935.) For a Compromise and Release agreement to be effective, the necessary elements of a contract must exist, including an offer of settlement of a disputed claim by one of the parties, and an acceptance by the other (*Id.*) There can be no contract unless there is a meeting of the minds and the parties mutually agree upon the same thing. (Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565, 1580; *Sackett v. Starr* (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 128; *Sieck v. Hall* (1934) 139 Cal.App.279, 291; *American Can Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co.* (1909) 12 Cal.App. 133, 137.)

Stipulations between the parties must be interpreted to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. (County of San Joaquin v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. (Sepulveda) (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1184 [69 Cal.Comp.Cases 193], citing Civ. Code, §1636.) Stipulations are binding on the parties unless, on a showing of good cause, the parties are given permission to withdraw from their agreements. (County of Sacramento v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (Weatherall) (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1121 [65 Cal.Comp.Cases 1].) As defined in Weatherall, "A stipulation is 'An agreement between opposing counsel ... ordinarily entered into

for the purpose of avoiding delay, trouble, or expense in the conduct of the action,' (Ballentine, Law Dict. (1930) p. 1235, col. 2) and serves 'to obviate need for proof or to narrow range of litigable issues' (Black's Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1415, col. 1) in a legal proceeding." (Weatherall, supra, at 1118.)

Once it is determined that an agreement is final, the party seeking to set aside the agreement must make a showing of good cause. Good cause includes fraud, duress, undue influence, mutual mistake of fact, mistake of law, invalidity of execution, incompetency, or minority at the time of execution of the agreement. (See California Workers' Compensation Law (Cont. Ed. Bar 4th Ed.) §§ 16.61 et seq.; see also Argonaut Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 706 [23] Cal.Comp.Cases 34]; Smith v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1160 [50] Cal.Comp.Cases 311]; Carmichael v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 311 [30] Cal.Comp.Cases 169]; Silva v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1924) 68 Cal. App. 510 [11 IAC 266]; City of Beverly Hills v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 62 Cal.Comp.Cases 1691 (writ den.); Bullocks, Inc. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1951) 16 Cal. Comp. Cases 253 (writ den.); Pac. Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1946) 11 Cal. Comp. Cases 117 (writ den.).) Whether good cause exists is case specific. The circumstances surrounding the execution and approval of the agreement must be assessed. (See § 5702; Weatherall, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1118-1121; Robinson v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1987) 199 Cal.App.3d 784, 790-792 [52 Cal.Comp.Cases 419]; Huston v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 95 Cal. App. 3d 856, 864-867 [44 Cal. Comp. Cases 798].)

As the moving party, applicant has the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, he should be relieved from the settlement agreement entered into with defendant. (See Lab. Code, § 5705 [the burden of proof rests upon the party with the affirmative of the issue]; see also Lab. Code, § 3202.5 ["All parties and lien claimants shall meet the evidentiary burden of proof on all issues by a preponderance of the evidence"].)

Here, applicant seeks to set aside the OACR, but no evidence of good cause has been admitted into the record. In the absence of evidence, we are unable to evaluate applicant's contentions. The Petition is therefore premature.

As explained in *Hamilton v. Lockheed Corporation* (2001) 66 Cal.Comp.Cases 473, 476 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 350-351], a decision "must be based on admitted evidence in the record" (*Id.* at p. 478) and must be supported by substantial evidence. (§§ 5903, 5952, subd. (d); *Lamb v.*

Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310]; Garza v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500]; LeVesque v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) Aside from providing assurance that due process is being provided, this "enables the parties, and the Board if reconsideration is sought, to ascertain the basis for the decision, and makes the right of seeking reconsideration more meaningful." (Hamilton, supra, at 476, citing Evans v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 753, 755 [33 Cal.Comp.Cases 350, 351].)

Further, all parties to a workers' compensation proceeding retain the fundamental right to due process and a fair hearing under both the California and United States Constitutions. (*Rucker v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 151, 157-158 [97 Cal Rptr. 2d 852, 65 Cal.Comp.Cases 805].) A fair hearing is "... one of 'the rudiments of fair play' assured to every litigant ..." (*Id* at 158.) As stated by the California Supreme Court in *Carstens v. Pillsbury* (1916) 172 Cal. 572, "the commission ... must find facts and declare and enforce rights and liabilities, in short, it acts as a court, and it must observe the mandate of the constitution of the United States that this cannot be done except after due process of law." (*Id.* at p. 577.) A fair hearing includes, but is not limited to, the opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses; introduce and inspect exhibits; and to offer evidence in rebuttal. (See *Gangwish v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1295 [66 Cal.Comp.Cases 584]; *Rucker, supra*, at 157- 158 citing *Kaiser Co. v. Industrial Acci. Com.* (*Baskin*) (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 54, 58 [17 Cal.Comp.Cases 21]; *Katzin v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 703, 710 [57 Cal.Comp.Cases 230].)

Accordingly, since there is currently no evidence admitted into the record regarding applicant's allegations, and to ensure applicant is provided due process, we will return this matter to the trial level for further proceedings. Upon return of this matter to the trial level, we recommend the WCJ treat applicant's Petition as a petition to set aside, including the setting of a hearing so applicant can provide evidence in support of his arguments and create a record upon which a decision can be made by the WCJ. After the WCJ issues a decision, either party may then timely seek reconsideration of that decision.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that applicant's Petition for Reconsideration of the March 26, 2024 Order Approving Compromise and Release is **DISMISSED** and this matter is **RETURNED** to the trial level for further proceedings and a decision by the WCJ consistent with this opinion.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ CRAIG SNELLINGS, COMMISSIONER

I CONCUR,

/s/ KATHERINE WILLIAMS DODD, COMMISSIONER



KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR CONCURRING NOT SIGNING

DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

JULY 8, 2024

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

DANIEL LOPEZ FLETCHER B. BROWN LAW FIRM LAUGHLIN, FALBO, LEVY & MORESI

RL/cs